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Background
Digital watermarking has been recognized as a helpful technology for copyright protection, traitor tracing, and authentication, where robustness is considered to be a critical issue affecting the practicability of the watermarking system and has received most attention. The basis of conventional watermarking methods is established based on Kerckhoffs principle [13] in that the watermarking embedding and detection algorithms are public and the parameters (e.g., secret key) are kept secret. This implies that the secrecy of a watermarking system relies on the secret key instead of the algorithm. As a result, watermarking methods presented to date mostly obey this principle; i.e., the embedding and the detection keys are the same and kept secret. This watermarking paradigm is called "symmetric" watermarking.
Basically, when the secret key in symmetric watermarking is to be used for detection, it is exposed accordingly and can merely be used only once. In addition, the disclosure of the secret key can efficiently assist watermark-estimation attack [14] in removing watermarks. One solution to this problem is to use a secret key for embedding and a different but public key for watermark detection. This is known as "asymmetric" watermarking in which Hartung and Girod's study [12] is believed to pioneer this topic. However, the current asymmetric watermarking approaches only possess limited robustness [9] or suffer from the difficulty of securely integrating the asymmetric protocol and other watermarking components [11] .
An alternative way in investigating a symmetric watermark detection protocol without revealing the secret information is zero-knowledge watermark detection [1, 2, 3, 7, 8] . The principle behind the zero-knowledge detection protocol is that a prover able to convince a verifier that he/she certainly knows a secret without revealing this secret to verifier. The first zero-knowledge watermarking scheme was introduced by Craver [7] . In this protocol, the prover generates many fake watermarks and combine these with the legal watermark into a set, and then prove to verifier that there is a legal watermark belongs to this set. The above procedures can be performed several rounds to prevent the dishonest attempt of a prover. More specifically, for each round, a cheating prover can successfully pass the verification of the protocol with probability 1 2 . Nevertheless, if the prover and the verifier operate this protocol with polynomial iterations, then the dishonest prover can only pass the protocol with negligibly low probability, i.e., the verifier can be convinced with high probability. Although the zero-knowledge watermark detection protocol can be used to show the presence of a watermark without needing to reveal it, the cheating behavior of a prover has not been avoided efficiently. As pointed out in [1] , a cheating prover can intentionally choose a "faked" watermark as though it were the legal watermark to pass the verification of this protocol and deceive the verifier. The constraint is that the faked watermark should be chosen to be a detectable watermark still in the form of discrete logarithm. The existence of cheating prover in zeroknowledge watermark detection can be regarded as a variant of ambiguity attacks [6] . Although Craver [7] proposed a graph isomorphism and scrambling-based zero-knowledge watermark detection protocol, and exploited the hard problem of Hamiltonian cycle to prevent from the birthday attack, some difficulties (e.g., disclosing the characteristics of watermarks) still remain with this scheme. Another shortcoming of Craver's protocol is that a large number of iterative conversations between the prover and the verifier is required.
Another type of zero-knowledge watermark detection protocol, which exploits the existent zero-knowledge proof as its sub-function, is developed by Adelsbach and Sadeghi [1, 2] . For a watermarking scheme, the prover re-formulates the correlation between the original watermark and the extracted watermark into an appropriate form and employ the existing zero-knowledge protocol to prove for the verifier that the watermark exists without leaking any secret information. Once again, their protocol similar to Craver's protocol needs to be operated in a number of iterations. In [3] , the authors further pointed out one particular requirement that in some applications the prover must prove in a zero-knowledge manner that her watermark must satisfy a certain distribution.
In addition to the above two identified problems (iterative communication and cheating prover), we also find that the zero-knowledge watermark detection protocols presented so far are not established based on a robust watermarking scheme. It is known that attacks were divided into four categories [20] : (1) removal attacks; (2) geometric attacks; (3) cryptographic attacks; and (4) protocol attacks. Therefore, motivated by the needs of sufficient robustness, this study focuses on proposing a non-interactive zero-knowledge watermark detection protocol based on the media hash-dependent watermarking schemes [14, 15] , which were previously verified to be robust against extensive geometric attacks, and watermark-estimation attacks (including the collusion and copy attacks). It is quite practical to imagine that a watermark must be able to be detected from an attacked data by an owner in advance before the zero-knowledge watermark detection protocol is performed. Otherwise, the problem about "How can the owner prove to the verifier that he/she really owns the legal watermark, which unfortunately cannot be detected from a suspect data?" is unreasonable.
Contributions of this Work
In this paper, we study the following challenging problems: (i) zero-knowledge detection protocol is integrated with robust image watermarking schemes [14, 15] that were verified to be robust against extensive signal processing (including removal and geometric) attacks so that robustness is still retained; (ii) the watermarks revealed for zero-knowledge detection are still secured by a secret key-based shuffling function so that the verifier cannot have the knowledge about the hidden watermarks; (iii) Hamiltonian cycles are embedded into an image so as to prevent from dishonest prover; and (iv) we propose to package all the queries of the verifier and the corresponding answers of the prover in order to achieve non-interactive communication between the prover and the verifier. The above characteristics obviously distinguish our method between the existing methods.
MEDIA HASH-DEPENDENT IMAGE WATERMARKING SCHEME
Since the main theme of this study is to investigate a non-interactive zero-knowledge watermark detection protocol that is based on a robust watermarking scheme, it is necessary to start by briefly describing how our media hashdependent watermarks are constructed. Then, the proposed protocol is described in the next section.
In this paper, our discussion of zero-knowledge watermark detection protocol will be build based on a mesh-based media hash-dependent image watermarking scheme [15] that has been verified to possess sufficiently robustness. Based on robust feature extraction and mesh generation processes, a cover image is first divided into a set of triangular meshes, Mesh = {Mi} i=1,2,··· ,M , where M denotes the number of meshes. For each mesh Mi, it is treated as an embedding unit and is embedded with a content-dependent watermark. In addition, with respect to the set of meshes Mesh a set of media hashes Hash = {MHi} i=1,2···M is extracted and has been verified to be robust against extensive geometric attacks [17] . The proposed mesh-based media hash-dependent watermark MMHWi is composed of a watermark W generated using a secret key and a MHi as
where S is a secret key-based shuffling function, which is used to control the combination of W and MHi. In addition to resisting collusion attack and copy attack [14] , we can also observe from Eq. (1) that error-resilient media hash instead of fragile cryptographic hash is adopted in this paper. Furthermore, our watermark W is not dependent on the cover image, instead W is made to (highly) correlated with the cover image by incorporating the media hash. Readers should refer to [15] for more details about the issues of how to construct a mesh, how a mesh-based media hash is generated, and how a watermark can be embedded into a mesh. It is worth mentioning that since the proposed zero-knowledge watermark detection protocol is built based on this verified robust image watermarking scheme, resistance to signal processing attacks is still retained when ZKWD is mentioned. In the following, when we are talking about the zero-knowledge proof of a legal watermark, we refer to MMHWi.
NON-INTERACTIVE ZERO-KNOWLED-GE WATERMARK DETECTION
The so-called non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof stemmed from the idea of Santis et al. [18] and Blum et al. [4] . In the NIZK protocol, two parties do not need any communications, except sending one data set from the prover Alice to the verifier Bob [19] . This idea motivates us to develop a non-interactive zero-knowledge watermark detection protocol. Moreover, a robust watermarking scheme [14, 15] is considered to be integrated with the proposed NIZK watermark detection protocol because only the watermarks can be successfully detected from suspect images, the NIZK detection protocol can be triggered. In what follows, the issues regarding media hash-dependent watermark embedding to retain robustness, construction of a Hamiltonian cycle to prevent from cheating provers, and non-interactive zero-knowledge detection protocol to avoid interactive conversations will be, respectively, described.
Media Hash-dependent Watermark Embedding
For image watermarking, Alice first publishes a prime number p and a positive integer a ∈ [1, p − 1], from which a watermark (W ) is generated to be a discrete log form, i.e., W ≡ a x (mod p). Then, the media hash-dependent watermark is generated based on Eq. (1) and watermark embedding is performed using our previous method [15] . After these steps, let I s denote the stego image. The watermark generation, the media hash-dependent watermark construction, and the embedding procedure are described as follows:
1. Alice chooses a positive integer x, sets W ≡ a x (mod p), and generates MMHWi = S(MHi · W ) for the i-th mesh.
2. Let MMHW = {MMHWi} be denoted as the set of all media hash-dependent watermarks that will be embedded into a cover image I [15] and let I s temp temporarily denote the resultant stego image in this study.
In the proposed method, I
s temp is further manipulated to contain so-called Hamiltonian cycles, as will be described in Sec. 3.2. After that, we let the Hamiltonian cycle embedded result be the final stego image that can be published and be denoted as I s .
Use of Hamiltonian Cycle to Avoid Cheating Prover
In the ZKWD protocol, a cheating prover may construct a fake watermark still with a discrete log form and prove it to the verifier. In order to deal with this problem, for each image we randomly select a Hamiltonian cycle and embed 1 it into the image. Under this construction, the prover can present the Hamiltonian cycle of an image to prove that she indeed knows something secret about the stego image. Under this circumstance, a graph is said to have a Hamiltonian cycle if there exists a path passing through a graph that visits each node exactly once. On the other hand, if an attacker (e.g., cheating prover) tries to find the Hamiltonian cycle from an image, then it is necessary to evaluate where the Hamiltonian cycle is. According to [10] , we know that this problem is NP -complete. In our study, this property will be exploited to prevent from cheating provers.
In what follows, the procedure of constructing a Hamiltonian cycle in an image is described. 1 It should be noted that unlike [7] we propose an alternative way of using Hamiltonian cycles to deal with the problem of cheating provers.
as the entry bi,j of I half as 
In this step, the design of ei,j 's in the second and the third rows directly affect the robustness of Hamiltonian cycles and the fidelity of a stego image. These issues will be further discussed in the remainder of this paper.
As described in the above procedure, the functions, s . It is not hard to find that all these steps can be finished in polynomial time that is proportional to the size of an image. In order to better illustrate the procedure of constructing a Hamiltonian cycle in an image, a toy example is further described in Sec. 3.2.1.
Without loss of generality, THRESHOLD is set to 128 by assuming pixel values are a uniform distribution. Nevertheless, the distribution of pixel values is not always uniform.
As a result, we can use the average pixel value as THRESHOLD. Under this circumstance, when the average pixel value is small or large enough, it is possible for a cheating prover to easily execute exhaustive search so as to find the Hamiltonian cycle in an image.
However, embedding of a Hamiltonian cycle is equivalent to embedding of a watermarking in that the conflicting requirements of invisibility and robustness must be satisfied. Although the above simple implementation cannot fulfill this goal, embedding technologies exist to achieve it. This is because we also find that the role of a Hamiltonian cycle in resisting the cheating behaviors of provers is equivalent to that of a pilot signal in recovering the asynchronization induced by geometric attacks. Since the pilot signals is easily defeated by means of the collusion and copy attacks [14] , the desired functionality is lost as well. Similarly, if the robustness of Hamiltonian cycles cannot achieve the same level as watermarks, the functionality of resisting cheating provers will also be lost. Fortunately, we have presented a robust image watermarking scheme [15] that can prevent from estimation attacks. As a result, we will plan to enhance the fidelity and robustness of embedded Hamiltonian cycles by exploiting the scheme [15] instead of the simple implementation illustrated here.
On the other hand, if the mesh-based media hash-dependent watermarking scheme [15] is considered, the above procedure can be similarly applied to each mesh so that multiple Hamiltonian cycles are embedded into an image. Under these circumstances, to find a Hamiltonian cycle from an image will become more difficult, as described in Sec. 3.2.3.
A Toy Example of Constructing Hamiltonian Cycle
Let the temporary stego image I s temp be simply expressed as In the fourth step, the stego image I s that can published is derived as It should be noted that we have not concerned the distribution of pixel values and the threshold T HRESHOLD = 128 is simply used.
Embedding of a Hamiltonian Cycle vs. Fidelity
This issue is discussed from two cases. In the first case, the corresponding graph I graph of a stego image of size N ×N obtained from the first two steps of Sec. 3.2 contains no edges. This represents the worst case that more pixels are needed to be modified to construct a Hamiltonian cycle. Even so, it is adequate to modify exactly N pixels to guarantee the generation of a Hamiltonian cycle.
In the second case, we consider that I graph initially contains edges. To simplify analysis, it is assumed that the distribution of the image is uniform and we would like to know how many pixels of an image need to be modified to create a Hamiltonian cycle. For an image of size N × N , there are at most nodes. Since a Hamiltonian cycle is a sequence of N edges passing through all vertices in a graph, therefore, it is sufficient for us to modify at most N − ((
pixels to derive a graph that contains a Hamiltonian cycle. In order to enhance the practicality of Hamiltonian cycle embedding, both watermarks and Hamiltonian cycles should be embedded in the same way because Hamiltonian cycles act like watermark signals and must satisfy invisibility and robustness against attacks.
Attacks on Construction of Hamiltonian Cycles
In this study, the embedding of Hamiltonian cycles is introduced to prevent cheating prover. A concern here is that the dishonest prover may try to find the Hamiltonian cycles by exploiting the existing techniques (e.g., Bollobás et al.'s algorithm [5] ). In the following, we will discuss the possibility of detecting the embedded Hamiltonian cycles.
Let Gv,κ be a graph with v vertices and κ edges. + 0.1v, i.e., when δ = 0.1, the probability defined in Eq. (2) is approximate 0.44. Thus, it is important to select a proper value of T HRESHOLD for use in Sec. 3.2. Furthermore, if several Hamiltonian cycles (the number depends on the number of meshes in an image in our study) are constructed for an image, the probability for a dishonest prover to find all the embedded Hamiltonian cycles would be sufficiently low (e.g., the probability would be 0.44 25 ≈ 1.22e −9 if 25 Hamiltonian cycles are constructed). Thus, we need a solution to defeat Bollobás et al.'s algorithm in finding Hamiltonian cycles. In view of these, it becomes obviously that the design of constructing Hamiltonian cycles in an image can be exactly consistent with the employed image watermarking scheme, as described in Sec. 2. This is because our watermarking scheme is proposed to be mesh-based and each mesh area can be embedded with a Hamiltonian cycle with the aim that more than one Hamiltonian cycle is embedded.
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Watermark Detection
According to the mesh-based media hash-dependent image watermarking scheme [15] , a stego image is assumed to be decomposed intoά meshes and α of them can be detected by means of our watermark detection process (which means that the detected correlation is larger than a pre-determined threshold), whereά ≥ α. Now, the proposed non-interactive watermark detection protocol is described as follows.
At the beginning, Alice sets
Among the elements of F j (j = t), they do not contain the originally embedded watermarks; on the contrary, all the watermarks except for those in MMHW that can be detected can be easily generated by means of denoising-based watermark extraction [14] or ambiguity attack [6] . For example, one can use some high-pass filters (e.g., Wiener filtering) to filter the stego image so that a set of extracted watermarks can be yielded. 
Here, m denotes the number of interactive conversations used in a traditional interactive zero-knowledge proof protocol. Then, each element of F is multiplied by the integer matrix to yield the corresponding set
3. Alice devises a set of graph isomorphism corresponding to I HC graph , Giso = {G1, · · · , Gm}, and encrypts them into G iso = {G 1 , · · · , G m }. For graph isomorphism, we mean that the nodes are randomly permuted and their edges are also permuted accordingly. In addition, the graph encryption considered here is only operated on the edges of a given graph. Graph isomorphism can be done in polynomial-time since the number of swap operations is proportional to the number of nodes. The aim of this step [19] is for the prover to prove to the verifier that she knows the Hamiltonian cycles of I HC graph without revealing them, as will be described in step 5.
4. In order to achieve non-interactive conversation, Alice has to prepare a sequence Q of random queries. To do so, the random queries can be yielded by means of one way hashing, i.e., Q = q1q2 · · · qm = OWH(I s ). The function OWH is public so that the verifier Bob can check whether the query sequence Q is randomly generated from the publicly known stego data I s .
5. According to the value of qi, the prover Alice prepares the set A = {Ai|1 ≤ i ≤ m} of answers in advance:
• if qi = 0, Alice must show the relation between In our protocol, the full understanding of a Hamiltonian cycle in an image is exploited to distinguish true prover between false prover. Also, one may concern "whether some secrets may be leaked?" The answer is "NO" because in each round i the prover gives the verifier either the vertex permutation between the I HC graph and Gi or the Hamiltonian cycle of Gi by decrypting G i . This implies the prover never gives both of them to the verifier. As a consequence, the verifier cannot get the whole knowledge of the Hamiltonian cycle in I s . The principle behind our non-interactive zero-knowledge proof is to package all the answers (as indicated in step 6) that the prover requires to prepare and all the queries that the verifier will raise into a set. In order for the proposed protocol to be fair and practical, the sequence of queries is generated by means of a cryptographic one-way hash function with the stego image I s as the input, as indicated in step 4. In the other words, the i-th bit of Q = q1q2 · · · qm = OWH(I s ) is equal to the query of the verifier in i-th round of zero-knowledge proof. Although the overhead of information that should be transmitted from the prover to the verifier is not reduced, the number of interactions has been greatly reduced to only one. The additional merit is that the verifier can check the copyright of media data offline.
Despite the more or less trivial interactive protocol presented by us, it would be fair to say that the existing protocols can also be made non-interactive using other designs.
Remarks
It can be found that our non-interactive zero-knowledge watermark detection protocol follows the principle proposed by Craver [7, 8] . However, our protocol presents some characteristics that distinguish ours, Craver's, other methods [1, 2, 3] . First, the aim of our detection protocol is designed to extend our robust watermarking scheme [15] that has been verified to resist removal attacks, extensive geometric attacks, and watermark-estimation attacks [14] to further satisfy zero-knowledge watermark detection. Second, our protocol is designed to operate in a non-interactive manner such that the major weakness of zero-knowledge detection is alleviated. Third, the set of originally embedded watermarks, F t , that is sent out publicly are still secured except that the shuffling function [16] described in the first step 1 of Sec. 3.1 can be easily broken. These characteristics are quite different from the previous work in the literature.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HONEST/CHEATING PROVER AND HONEST/CHEATING VERIFIER
In the zero-knowledge detection protocol, conversations happen between the prover and the verifier so that the prover can prove to the verifier that she really knows the hidden watermark. In practice, both the prover and the verifier may be honest or dishonest, as shown in Fig. 1 , where four scenarios may occur depending on the behaviors of the prover and verifier. Figs. 1(a) and (b) show the abilities of current protocols and our protocol in dealing with these four scenarios, each of which will be explained in the following.
First, let's consider that both the prover and verifier are honest in that the verifier has a stego image legally obtained from the owner, and the prover legally represents the owner to execute zero-knowledge watermark detection. According to this scenario, the prover can exploit either the existing protocols or our protocol to successfully prove the existence of a watermark to the verifier.
In the second scenario, we consider that both the prover and the verifier are dishonest. This is an interesting problem because the verifier can attack the received stego image I s to destroy/remove the hidden watermark, and the cheating prover has no knowledge about the to be detected image Relationship between the honest/dishonest prover and the honest/dishonest verifier: (a) the ability of current protocols; (b) the ability of our protocol. and tries to defraud the verifier. Obviously, a protocol is not required to be responsible for both dishonest parties, and this scenario can be ignored.
Third, when the cheating prover, who can fake the watermark, meets the honest verifier, the current zero-knowledge protocols suffer from this challenging problem. However, the introduced proof of the Hamiltonian cycle in an image can prevent from the cheating prover since we show that the cheating prover always cannot find Hamiltonian cycles from an image in reasonable time. Therefore, the third scenario is approximately solved by our protocol.
As for the fourth scenario, the honest prover meets the dishonest verifier, who will attack the received stego image. We consider that the solution to this scenario needs a robust zero-knowledge watermark detection protocol. If a zero-knowledge detection protocol is not established based on a robust watermark scheme, we consider that the watermarks cannot be successfully detected before the ZKWD protocol can be applied. Although the proposed protocol has been built on a robust image watermark scheme that was verified to be robust against benchmark attacks, the introduced Hamiltonian cycles, in its current status, may not be able to resist attacks (e.g., achieve the same level of robustness for watermarks to resist attacks). Nevertheless, if the partially recovered Hamiltonian cycle due to attacks is used, this problem may be properly solved in certain conditions. In other words, the robustness of a Hamiltonian cycle against attacks plays a key role, and this issue should be further studied.
CONCLUSIONS
Zero-knowledge watermark detection is practically important for watermark verification without (obviously) revealing any secret information. In this paper, we investigate this problem with particular emphasis on the issues of noninteractive conversation, prevention from cheating prover, and retaining robustness against attacks. Due to the noninteractive characteristic of our protocol, the prover Alice outputs publicly a certificate for zero-knowledge watermark detection so that we may regard this kind of non-interactive zero-knowledge detection protocol as a kind of asymmetric watermarking.
While zero-knowledge watermark detection protocol is an important step towards secure watermark detection, it can only function reasonably if an embedded watermark can be detected/extracted from attacked media data. As a result, robustness against attacks is believed to be the prerequisite that must be satisfied before zero-knowledge watermark detection protocol can be applied. That's why we attempt to extend the capability of our previous robust watermarking scheme to cover zero-knowledge watermark detection.
A problem we would like to particularly point out is resistance to ambiguity attacks (e.g., a kind of protocol attacks [20] ), which according to Craver et al.'s protocol [6] requires the owner to show how the so-called "original" watermark is generated from the so-called "original" cover data. Thus, the secret information is publicly revealed. Therefore, it is noted that the requirements of resistance to protocol attacks and zero-knowledge watermark detection protocol are contradictory. We think this is an interesting direction for further researching.
Although the proposed ZKWD protocol has been built on a robust image watermarking scheme, there are other robustness issues required for further researching in order to complete a robust ZKWD protocol. These include (i) robustness of the embedded discrete-form watermarks; and (ii) robustness of the embedded Hamiltonian cycles. One possible solution to the latter case is to employ partial matching so that the existence of a Hamiltonian cycle can still be measured. In practice, the current paper assumes that the stego image is the target for zero-knowledge watermark detection in order to avoid the above issues.
